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Towards a Framework for Supporting Professional Teamwork: 
Modelling Human Actions in Small Group Meetings 
Terence Blackburn, Paul Swatman 
School of Computer and Information Science 
City West Campus, University of South Australia 




Research into computer support for colocated small group meetings has not delivered any significant benefit in 
spite of significant investment and decades of research. We suggest that the focus has been on the wrong 
problem. Each time a process is enacted in small group work it will different (even if only slightly different) due 
to the situational context.  Therefore the process for supporting the process should also be different each time 
and prescriptive, systematised support will be of little value in this situation. We propose that the processes must 
be exposed and identified dynamically so that useful support can be provided when it is required and one of the 
first steps is to understand what people are doing in these processes. The main contribution of this paper is a 
framework for helping researchers to understand the problem before considering a solution. 
Keywords 
Meeting, support, emergent, situated, actions. 
Introduction 
Research in Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) has moved away from workplace support to focus 
on alternative settings such as homes, games and museums (Crabtree, Rodden & Benford 2005). Technological 
advances in computing, such as increased bandwidth, more processor power and denser storage technologies, 
have allowed researchers to widen their scope to include mobile, ambient, ubiquitous, mixed reality, wearable 
and embedded computer technologies. 
The move away from the workplace has happened prematurely. After decades of effort and significant 
investment, there are still no useful support mechanisms for ill structured, synchronous, colocated small group 
interactions; meetings, in other words - one of the key mechanisms for decision making and information 
dissemination in information systems. Where is the evidence for this claim? We only need to look at these 
meetings and (usually) the only visible technologies are slide shows on projectors (and mobile phones, which 
support individuals rather than groups). Where are all of the meeting support applications? 
Our definition of the problem is different from previous research. Most of the actions that occur in meetings are 
emergent and situated, which means that they are influenced by their context and environment (Suchman 1987). 
The unpredictable nature of these actions – and, by definition, these actions are unstructured - makes it 
practically impossible to completely (or even partially) systematise technological support. We posit that work 
processes that are not (formally) structured are either semi structured or ill structured (where “structure” refers 
to predefined processes.) These ill structured processes are what we term “creative” processes because they 
cannot be fully systematised and cognitive effort – rather than technological effort - is required to execute them 
or find solutions for them. There is no premeditated focus on creativity per se, but instead a recognition that 
arbitrary work tasks will often be performed in a different way each time they are executed (Suchman 1987) and 
the path that people choose to navigate through their tasks is emergent. If we accept this, how can a systemised 
approach be flexible enough to cope with all of the variations in the processes? How can an application support 
an activity now when we don’t know what is currently happening in a workspace and the current processes are 
likely to be different from those in our original problem domain?’ 
In our view, the CSCW community is trying to solve the wrong problem. (We also include complementary or 
associated domains such as GDSS and Groupware in this statement.) The problem that CSCW research tries to 
solve was defined with known pre and post conditions but without any knowledge of the contextual aspects of 
process enactment. The solution to the problem was designed in the mistaken belief that the exact same problem 
or task would reoccur when the support application was deployed. The enactment of the process in any task is 
context dependant and will be different from the same process of five hours ago or five weeks ago. Any two 
process enactments will be different in either subtle or obvious ways. 
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This paper proposes an alternative approach to providing support for synchronous, colocated group interactions 
but the scope of this work is limited to groups that have a “Western” cultural influence. It proposes that support 
for process enactment should be dynamically driven by the emergent actions of group participants. Existing 
tools and applications can be dynamically introduced as required to support the finer grained actions – as small 
parts of activities – rather than offering prescribed support for a sequenced set of actions where the application 
will be unable to keep in step with the emergent and unpredictable set of human actions. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Our background section explores some of the work and some of 
the criticism of the work that has tried to support ill structured tasks. We extend this in the next two sections to 
characterise the issues and nature of these tasks. Then we consider how to go about modelling human actions in 
small group settings such as meetings and this leads to our proposed framework. This takes up most of the rest 
of the paper although we include some discussion of our approach. We finish by summarising our work to date 
as well as providing a description of where we are taking this work. 
Background 
The claim that structured and prescriptive approaches have failed to support small group interaction is not a new 
observation. Writers have been articulating this problem either directly or indirectly for years. In 1990, for 
example, one view purported that modern technologies had failed to improve meeting efficiency or they were 
largely impractical (Robinson 1990). In 1997 it was suggested that although CSCW frameworks had contributed 
much to our understanding of the field, they could still be criticised for a lack of understanding of the complex 
social activities – perhaps too difficult rather than misunderstood - that make up group work and this often led to 
the failure of well designed CSCW applications (Ngwenyama & Lyytinen 1997). In 1998 developers were 
criticised for often focusing on the technology. They produced highly sophisticated software systems to address 
problems that may not have existed in real groups or they may not have effectively addressed their problems 
(Kamel & Davison 1998). In 2000 in a book detailing workplace studies, the editors argued that technologies 
explicitly aimed at supporting collaborative group activities missed their mark completely. They seemed to be ill 
suited to the contingent, emergent and collaborative aspects of the work they claimed to support (Luff, 
Hindmarsh & Heath 2000). 
If we look beyond the CSCW domain and instead consider the current status of Group Decision Support 
Systems (GDSS), Paul Gray has a similar message to impart. He says that GDSS “is an idea which has come 
and, sad to say, has gone”. That is not to say that the research in this field was not useful as it has had spin offs 
in data mining, knowledge management and business intelligence (Gray 2007). Some of the benefits of GDSS 
include the ability to increase the functional size of a small group beyond what is normally considered 
productive through the use of technological infrastructures, and the ability to negate, to some extent, the effects 
of individual dominance in a group through the use of anonymous contributions during activities such as 
brainstorming. (The latter has beneficial social side effects.) 
Social aspects of group interaction have not been accorded much more attention than noting them and agreeing 
that that are important. Few systems have been built to support social characteristics such as: group building; 
equity sharing (in terms of shared power); and managing truth or deception in human interaction. It is likely that 
we are far from addressing these issues but one aspect that has been recognised and studied is the contingent and 
emergent nature of the human actions in small group tasks (Suchman 1987). These ideas - where the execution 
of a task is determined to some extent by its context, the people involved and the environment - have been 
studied and argued about for some time. Our research accepts this characterisation of work and, even though 
Suchman’s ideas may be correct and often cited, trying to develop technologies to support the concept of 
situated and emergent work may not be useful. The ideas don’t lead anywhere and it has been difficult to do 
anything with them (from a technological point of view). 
Perhaps it is appropriate to use Kuhn’s model (Kuhn 1962) and suggest that it is too early to adopt these ideas 
because technologies have not evolved far enough to support them. (We recognise that Kuhn believed that the 
paradigm shifts he described only applied to scientific domains but we would not be the first people to extend 
the idea beyond and into sociological contexts.) Notwithstanding the possible premature nature of our research, 
we include changing circumstances, ad hoc actions and ill structuredness as being essential components in 
small group interaction. We seek to design applications that treat change and ill structuredness as mandatory 
components of a small group work model and not as exceptions that are dealt with as undesirable side effects. 
Many attempts have been made to go down this path and “emergent workflow” (Jorgensen 2004) is an 
illustrative example. 
In this work, as in much other research, a graphical model is used to provide a flexible representation of the 
work activities of self directed groups alongside their established work processes. The workflow activities are 
coordinated through “mutual adjustments” and travel through decision points. The modelling language is 
accessible to non programmers and participants use contextual awareness to allow themselves to steer their 
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activities and to control enactment of the process. In summary, an emergent workflow is a flexible, partially 
structured process model that emerges from the work. The process definition is interleaved with it’s enactment 
and allows users to dynamically add tools and information types (Jorgensen & Carlsen 1999). However, one of 
the costs of using the application is speed. This cost might be too high where people in meetings want to work 
quickly and interacting with a workflow may seem unnatural and may represent a time constraint. 
Social issues and supporting the contingent, emergent nature of work are problems that have been well 
documented but have not been solved. A recent platform had as one of it’s specific goals support for the 
emergent and unpredictable nature of work but it did not meet this goal (Bogia, LTolone et al. 1993). Successes 
have consistently fallen far short of expectations and issues (in no particular order) include: the disparity 
between those who will use an application and those who must support it; the lack of management intuition 
which leads to decision-making failure and to ill-fated development efforts; and the extreme difficulty of 
evaluating these applications (Grudin 1988). 
Other similar approaches have included layered policies in the definition of the business process (Bogia, D P & 
Kaplan 1995), “advisory” process models (Abbot & Sarin 1994) and “libraries of actions”, which are invoked 
when participants in the activity consider them to be useful (Carlsen & Gjersvik 1997). From our knowledge of 
the literature, none of these systems is used in real small group meetings. One question that arises from this 
work is ‘if a flexible workflow is made so flexible that it can’t execute without human intervention, when does it 
stop being a workflow?’ Our answer is ‘when it has to dynamically respond to human caprice, which is a 
completely non prescriptive activity’. 
Issues in Colocated Meetings 
The CSCW field has been dominated by models of collaborative teams in academic or design environments. 
Such settings are characterised by relatively equal levels of personal power and a division of labour established 
by the collaborating parties (Eason 1996). Outside of these domains many groups have unequal levels of power 
and introducing technology that levels the playing field can only be good for the weaker parties. Why then 
would the stronger, more powerful parties be interested in utilising technologies? Politics enters the picture. 
Politics provides another reason for the dearth of computerised technologies in meetings (Vogel 2006). Groups 
sometimes may not want to remember decisions and some participants may not want their positions to be 
explicitly articulated and disseminated. A facility for “active forgetting” is deemed to be a requirement in a 
meeting system (Maaranen & Lyytinen 1995). There is a documented account of a group of researchers who 
tried to implement a colocated meeting support system in a round of multilateral diplomatic meetings. The 
account detailed the endless problems associated with the implementation, which was eventually abandoned 
(Maaranen & Lyytinen 1995). Lessons learned during the process included: organisational and procedural 
constraints can affect user acceptance; the design process must be broadened to include social and psychological 
factors; the whole room should be used as a user interface instead of just tailoring the application; and personal 
factors, task related factors and social aspects all represent a part of the process and should form components in 
every meeting support framework. If the solution is even partially misaligned with the problem, then, people 
may reject the technology solution for a number of reasons. These may include: it doesn’t solve the problem 
satisfactorily, the cost of altering the computer generated solution may be too high or it doesn’t solve enough of 
the problem to warrant using the technology. (In the case of “politics” there may be no technological support 
solution.) 
What are the main issues in meetings that need computer support? The following list identifies a few of the 
issues: too much time is spent arranging meetings; insufficient time is spent in analysing issues during meetings; 
too much time is spent travelling to meetings; and time is wasted collecting and tabulating anonymous votes 
during meetings. It is difficult to collect and analyse data from meeting members, there is a poor focus on the 
task resulting in poor use of time and too much time is spent filling in forms and searching for documents 
(Kamel & Davison 1998). (Even though this reference is twenty years old the problems haven’t changed 
because they haven’t been satisfactorily solved.) 
This work does not seek to render unnecessary the research and applications that have been built over recent 
decades but instead it seeks to find more efficient and timely ways of deploying them. We have identified a gap 
in the research, which we describe as providing contextually relevant and dynamic technological support for 
meetings. We want to identify and articulate exactly what people are doing in meetings at any given point in 
time. If we can do this with a high degree of confidence, we may be able to build and provide useful supportive 
technologies that deploy when they are needed and in the format that is required. This approach is non 
prescriptive and takes its cue directly from the meeting participants. 
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Autonomic, Automatic and Semi-automatic Support 
This project is a component in a larger field of research (Swatman, Blackburn et al. 2005) that seeks to provide 
autonomic, automatic and semi automatic, ICT mediated support to synchronous, colocated small groups of 
professional “Western” workers. 
Autonomic support means self managing or instigating an action or series of actions in response to a set of states 
observed by sensors. The concept comes from human physiology where the body acts in a way that is self 
repairing, self configuring, self protecting and self optimizing. Automatic and semi automatic responses are a 
little different in that interventions in a workspace are motivated by people’s activities and the responses are the 
result of artificial intelligence predictions of what is likely to happen next. It is worth illustrating the differences 
with examples. 
In a meeting room designed for six people but populated by ten people, it would be likely that the temperature 
would rise over a period of time and it may become uncomfortable. An autonomic intervention would occur 
when the air conditioner activated and started cooling the room to make it more comfortable. (This same thing 
also happens in the human body on a hot day.) An automatic intervention might consist of the computer 
interrogating a database for information that is contextually relevant to the dominant conversation in the meeting 
and displaying the information on a public screen. It means that group members will not have to explicitly 
invoke a service but, instead, the computer infrastructure will make a decision to intervene or offer an 
intervention (semi-automatic support). This highlights an important characteristic of this research; the human 
interface to the technological environment. 
Modelling Human Actions 
This interface is composed of cameras, microphones and other sensor devices that passively observe group 
members as they undertake their tasks. Cognitive dust, the raw data that represents evidence of human 
communications, is manifested and mediated between humans and sometimes through the use of computer 
devices (Blackburn, Swatman & Vernik 2007). This raw data can be observed and persisted in syntactic models 
that become increasingly coarser grained as the data is abstracted to higher levels. We can reason about these 
models within our theoretical framework in order to extract semantic meaning and our abstraction process stops 
at the highest level; a collection of concepts. 
As an example of this process, a person “pointing” is a semiotic, communicative action that conveys the “desire” 
of one person to focus the gaze of a second person in a certain direction. This is an example of cognition being 
mediated from one person through an arm and finger to another person and creating a linked set of dust 
elements. This pointing action is recorded through a camera as a set of frames and our model allows the 
infrastructure to reason that the first person, the pointer, wishes to transfer a piece of cognition, the “desire”, to 
the second person, whose focus should change in accordance with the direction of the finger. (Different levels in 
the model have been omitted from this explanation such as joining a set of frames to represent an arm movement 
and another set of frames that show the direction of the second person’s gaze.) Semantic meaning has been 
extracted from the pointing model and the infrastructure has “understood” the communicative intent. 
Automatically generated interventions may ensue at the focal point of the gaze (for example, a public screen) 
but this is dependant on verification by other evidence. For example, the second person’s gaze model might 
support the new focal point or a speech model may contain the words, “Look there!” This sentence contains an 
imperative and a direction and confirms the desire to move the focus to an indicated point. 
In the same manner, utterances, writing and other representations each have semantic meaning that can be 
extracted from their respective syntactic models. (One of our future objectives is to aggregate as many of these 
data streams as possible in order to build a richer model of workspace processes to increase our confidence that 
the infrastructure correctly “understands” the state of workspace activities. This will provide the best chance of 
correctly inferring future actions or processes from observing past and current processes. It may also provide an 
opportunity to intervene in the activity and provide a useful and appropriate tool to the group members.) One of 
our challenges in this work has been to model the cognitive dust in a suitable schema and store it in data 
repository. 
ThIS (schema) and RES (database) 
In this section we describe our Theory Informed Schema (ThIS), which is a template for informing the design of 
the data store, along with our Real-time Ethnographic Store (RES), which is the database used to persist 
cognitive dust collected from the workspace. This section describes the concepts and relationships depicted in 
Figure 1. 
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ThIS 
We are trying to understand, articulate and model human behaviour in our workspace in order to build a 
comprehensive framework for a computer infrastructure. While some low level data can captured with cameras, 
microphones and other devices and abstracted to model some of the activities within group interaction, the 
models usually lack meaning within the larger picture. For example, a person opens an application on a public 
screen. There is no information that might explain why the application was opened, what it might be used for 
and what might happen next. We believe that the only approach that might fill in these comprehension gaps is to 
look at existing work that attempts to provide explanations. Existing theories are the only source of illumination 
for this problem and there is an enormous body of instructive research in domains such as Social Psychology 
and Sociology. In these domains we have looked for and found theories that explain small components of the 
complex behaviours that takes place in human interaction.  
Each theory can do any or all of the following functions. It may describe its concepts. It may elaborate in the 
form of rhetoric. It may predict or reason about its concepts or it may have application within its reference 
domain (Halverson 2002). Each of the theories in this work articulates some of these functions (but rarely all of 
them) although description and rhetoric are usually produced at a level of abstraction that is too imprecise to be 
of value to us. In some cases the theories also take a positivist position. These ones are most useful in allowing 
us to understand what might be happening in an activity while at the same time providing a clue about what 
might happen in the future. 
 
Figure 1: ThIS (Schema) and RES (Database) 
Our collection of theories is stored in the theory bank (A in Figure 1) and it is the concepts in these theories that 
inform the design of our Theory Informed Schema (ThIS). In other words, ThIS is a repository of all of the 
concepts that can be identified in the theories of small group behaviour. It is constructed in a top down fashion 
where the concepts represent the highest layer (B in the figure). Examples of concepts are cooperation, 
competition, idea generation, dominance and (social) group support. 
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The concepts are decomposed into their component parts (C in the figure) which could abstract data structures. 
For example, concepts such as dominance, status or power can be manifested and described by a number of 
ways. Theories tell us that people who speak more (Rienks & Heylen 2006), smile less (Hall, Coats & LeBeau 
2005) or try and control a larger volume of physical space (Tiedens & Fragale 2003) may be exhibiting signs of 
dominance in the group. Components in these concepts would be respectively: a count of each speaker’s words; 
a count of each person’s smiles and an estimate of the volume each person tries to command within their 
personal space (particularly those people that try and increase their space). The components in these simple 
examples are also our primitives in the schema (D in the figure) so no further decomposition is required. The set 
of primitives (E in the figure) is available for the classifier to refer to when encountering the cognitive dust 
(Blackburn, Swatman & Vernik 2007) collected in the workspace. 
A more complex example provides counterpoint to the previous one. Idea generation is a concept that could also 
be a component in a more complex concept such as planning. On its own, it can be broken into components such 
as verbalising, writing, typing or arguing (amongst others). Verbalising can consist of sentences, questions, 
answers and suggestions. Each of these components (or concepts) can be further broken down to words; our 
primitives in this case. Typing on a computer can be deconstructed into keyboard events and mouse events, 
which is another example of the cognitive dust (3 in the figure) that can be observed in the workspace (1 in the 
figure). 
The dust components at this lowest level have been defined indirectly or inferred by the theories through the 
different levels of the schema and these categories are used to classify the dust. The classifier’s job is to identify, 
classify and persist the cognitive dust into RES in its various native formats (4 in the figure). 
RES 
RES is a multi-layered repository for cognitive dust in its unmodified (5 in the figure) and abstracted forms (7 in 
the figure). At the lowest level, RES0, the data formats include: WAV or MPEG files for captured video, WMA 
or MP3 for audio, textual representations of computer events, transcripts of speech, paper documents, electronic 
files in various formats and biometric data in native formats (2 in the figure). Functions are employed to abstract 
this raw dust into representations with higher level semantic meanings (6 in the figure). Words, for example, can 
be aggregated and processed to form sentences. (RES is currently implemented in the relational format.) The 
sentences are then stored at a higher level in RES0+m where m may or may not equal 1 as levels in RES can be 
bypassed. For example, a sentence can represent a concept directly and this might need immediate interpretation 
or it could be part of a conversation which could be part of a brainstorming session; another concept. These 
aggregations of lower level representations are built up through an iterative process and using different functions 
with results stored at successively higher layers in RES.  
Ultimately, at layer RESn, the cognitive dust has been processed and abstracted into the coarsest grains possible 
and this level represents concepts (8 in the figure), many of which can be found in the theory bank. 
Interestingly, RES can contain concepts that do not exist in the theories or have not been identified yet. For 
example, we are unable to a find useful theory that explains the meaning of hand actions that people use when 
they are talking. (We are hopeful that new theories can be abduced from our future empirical work). 
It is at this level - a collection of concepts - that people consciously comprehend their world and reason about 
people’s activities. They can tell who has been accepted as the leader in the group, who has superior work skills, 
who feels comfortable taking minutes and who sometimes likes to act like a clown. People observe instances of 
concepts such as competition, cooperation, conflict and harmony. At a semi conscious level they may infer 
succeeding actions from a series of current and previous states. This is based on learning and experience. For 
example, previous observations of Bob when he has been angry lead Mary to infer that Bob’s next action is to 
pick up an object and throw it somewhere. However, when Mary observes Philip displaying anger, she may 
reason that Philip will calm down quickly and apologise for his behaviour. The paired concepts of anger and 
violence and anger and contrition are each causal and show that Mary has been theorising at some level in a 
positivist style. From Bob’s anger she has inferred his violence and from Philip’s anger she has inferred his 
contrition. Mary has, subconsciously or otherwise, reasoned about the concepts and built two production rules. 
She may not have created the productions on her own, of course, as she may have adopted them from elsewhere. 
These productions, if they could be identified in theories, could help to infer future actions from current and 
previous actions or states.  
The concepts that Mary observes need to exist in her personal version of RES, which is, of course, her memory. 
In the same manner these concepts also need to exist in our version of RES. The concept of anger could be 
represented in a number of ways. It might be manifested as: violent physical actions which have no associated 
sounds; a series of words spoken with enough volume and angry content; or a lack of action but instead a fixed 
gaze along with a set of face contortions. Each of these sub concepts is represented at a lower level in RES by 
smaller components. To take the easiest example from above, the verbal violence would contain sentences or 
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words that would normally be associated with conflict. These could include contrary points of view, fixed points 
of view or dominating phrases. The change in volume would be easy to detect. 
If we can identify these concepts from the data in RES and if we can find theories that link the concepts 
causally, it may be possible understand what is happening in a small group. This understanding is represented in 
our model as the best candidate in a series of stories. A story is a description of an activity or process that has 
been derived from a theory. It is told from one perspective and many theories can each tell a slightly different 
story of the same data instance from its own perspective. This is because each theory has usually been generated 
by different data, in a different domain and with different subjects. It follows, then, that the theories and, 
consequently, the stories may be contradictory and they may be incomplete. The latter may come about due to a 
lack of evidence in the data to populate the story sufficiently. 
Each story or even a set of stories can be generated from a suitable theory and it is the theories that provide the 
basis for the process of interpretation. Separate candidate theories that focus on any arbitrary concept might help 
to explain the meaning of that concept or a set of linked concepts; evidence of which exists in the data. These 
candidate theories are selected from the theory bank by a single reporter (9 in the figure) which is responsible 
for monitoring the development of instances of that concept in the data. The reporter either interrogates RESn or 
data is pushed to it as soon as it appears in the database. The reporter is responsible for some pre-processing of 
candidate theories. It excludes those that are clearly irrelevant and sends those candidates with enough similarity 
to the interpreter for further processing (10 in the figure). 
Over time, and with different reporters populating the interpreter with candidate theories to suggest explanations 
of the group activities, pictures start to emerge. The pictures do not need to be high fidelity. People are 
sometimes able to function with very low fidelity impressions of group actions. This is particularly true when 
people have sufficient domain knowledge and / or experience to make accurate inferences. 
Deciding on the meaning of the pictures is the job of the interpreter. It will form its own view of the world 
within the group workspace. It may be an incorrect view or an incomplete view but over time and with a history 
of observations to consult, it may be more observant and more accurate that any individual in the group. It will 
have more eyes, more ears and more sensors to collect data that will, ultimately, generate stories. 
The interpreter represents the last line of processing in the data chain. This is the point where if it has a high 
enough level of confidence, the story is compelling, and it has something useful to do, it may make decisions. 
The decision might be to: make an entry into a record, for requirements engineering purposes; initiate an 
intervention in the meeting, in the case of orchestration; or to declare some type of confirmatory action, in the 
case of evaluation (11 in the figure). 
Even at this point, the multi-perspective story is likely to be ambiguous, imprecise and contradictory. This is an 
acceptable position, though, given that these characteristics sometimes also describe human perspectives on 
group actions. 
Motivating Example 
Much of our research focuses on teams of people but in this example we examine the actions of a dyad purely to 
illustrate a theoretical perspective. It is not difficult to extend the example to a group setting but this would add 
complexity without additional insight. The example focuses on some of the dominant behaviours or concepts 
that can be observed in group interaction. 
The scenario opens with two people sitting at a table in a small meeting room. Betty and Tom work in the same 
department of a large organisation and Betty is Tom’s boss. Tom has been working hard over the last six 
months. He has been putting in a lot of overtime and feels that he is overdue for a salary review. He wants to ask 
Betty to give him a raise but he is a submissive character and does not feel comfortable asking for the extra 
money. Tom smiles and opens the conversation but doesn’t say much that is meaningful. He tries to open the 
conversation with a comment about the football last week. Before he can change the subject and establish what 
he wants to say, Betty interrupts with a laugh, nods her head and makes a comment of her own. She doesn’t 
agree with Tom about the football and says so. She is wondering to herself why she is meeting with Tom when 
she has so much outstanding work of her own. Tom is immediately uncomfortable and tries to think of a suitable 
response to Betty’s comment. Tom was hoping the conversation would start on a note of agreement so that he 
could move straight into his request for a higher salary. Betty, who wants to finish the meeting as soon as 
possible, can see that Tom is a bit stuck for words. She pats him on the arm, gets straight to the point and asks 
why he wanted the meeting. Tom is on the spot now. He knows that Betty doesn’t have a lot of patience and has 
a bit of a reputation for being quick tempered. He has to do it now. He has to outline his case for the pay rise. 
Tom looks down and starts to talk in a soft voice about how hard he has been working. He is starting to sweat a 
little. Betty is silent and waits for Tom to make his point. She stares at him with a hint of annoyance on her face. 
Tom is really making a mess of this. The situation is getting a bit out of control. He is not saying what he had 
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practiced. In fact, his words are not making much sense to Betty. Before Tom can finish his sentence, Betty gets 
the idea that Tom wants to ask for a raise. She starts speaking over Tom who immediately shuts up. She speaks 
in a calm voice and finishes what Tom wanted to say for him. Tom is glad the issue has been raised. He smiles 
but says nothing and lets Betty do all of the talking. The problem is that Betty is under pressure from her boss to 
keep costs down and so has her own ideas about giving her people pay rises. She is under a bit of pressure now 
and starts to get a little more animated in her speech. She starts to use more hand actions and gestures as she tells 
Tom that now is not a good time to discuss a pay rise. 
There are many ways of analysing the scenario but we will stay with the theme of dominance. All of the 
examples are taken from the work that was introduced earlier (Hall, Coats & LeBeau 2005; Rienks & Heylen 
2006). It’s quite clear who is the boss and Betty’s behaviour reinforces her position. At the same time, Tom 
doesn’t help his own case by being fairly submissive. The first observation is that Tom is smiling. This has a 
meaning along the lines of “I won’t attack you” and when two people smile at each other they are establishing 
some common understanding that they want harmony rather than conflict. (Smiling is not related to laughing 
which has its roots in aspects of play.) 
The next observations are all behaviours that can be dominating. Nodding can mean that the nodder already 
knows what is being said (or pretends to know) while laughing implies that the laugher is relaxed. Fast talking 
means that more words are produced relative to a slower talker. Tom’s gaze is wandering which means that he is 
not looking directly at Betty. This may or may not indicate that Betty can out stare Tom, who may be the first to 
look away in such an activity. It may mean that Tom does not want to face an issue or it may mean that he is 
unable to respond to Betty. 
Betty is indicating her dominant status by touching Tom on the arm. She is initiating the action rather than 
responding to a touch from Tom, who is still floundering in the rest of the observations and is unable to maintain 
a position of equality with Betty. Evidence of some level of equality, for example, might include speaking an 
equal number of words, gazing directly at Betty, not allowing interruptions to his speech or creating a physically 
large presence, such as sitting up straight or using expansive hand gestures when talking (Tiedens & Fragale 
2003). 
The theories of dominance used in this example are part of a larger set that covers many different aspects of 
human behaviour in small group interaction. Some of the theories may contradict each other but does that make 
one right and another wrong? Not necessarily. Any arbitrary theoretical perspective can seem to be usefully 
descriptive or accurately predict a change in dependant variables in one situation but be dysfunctional in 
another.  
Discussion 
A number of components in this model currently remain undefined. A substantial amount of work will be 
required to identify and define all of the different functions used to transform concrete data from one level of 
RES to a higher level. For example, the function used to aggregate words into a sentence (low level primitives to 
a higher level data structure) is quite different from that which is used to define a head nodding. This example 
takes a series of different specific head positions and aggregates them into the nodding sequence. For other 
examples, a series of hand and arm gestures may resolve into someone pointing their finger at an object and a 
series of mouse events representing a “drag and drop” action on a computer file uses another function again 
although, since we have found no theory to represent the latter, we have had to make one as we go. 
Really useful theories make well defined claims, as in the positivist manner, about some aspect of group 
interaction. For a simple example, if person 1 is consistently speaking more than person 2, then person 1 may be 
exhibiting dominant behaviour relative to person 2 (Hall, Coats & LeBeau 2005; Rienks & Heylen 2006). 
(Dominance is used as a theme in this paper to promote some continuity and to make it more readable.) In the 
example, theories in this format allow us to expose production rules that can be used to generate stories in much 
the same manner as humans generate stories to explain conditional situations. In this case the reporter 
responsible for dominant speaking is looking for word counts in the data to populate a production rule such as: 
If (person 1, word count) > (person 2, word count) then person 1 ==> dominant  
This is a simple example of a production that exists among many in either of the two dominance theories 
mentioned earlier. At any point in time, many productions may be being populated and stories generated. Some 
of these stories are gong to be wrong and some are going to be contradictory. This creates a problem because we 
need to provide an interpretation mechanism that is as accurate as we can make it but we are required to work 
with data that may be incomplete and data that may be complete but inconclusive. This provides a whole new set 
of problems, which are beyond the scope of this paper. 
It would be reasonable to ask why should we go to the effort of developing theory when there is already a 
research domain for observing meetings and analysing (with limited success) their audio and video records 
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(Nijholt, Akker & Heylen 2004). The reason is that these projects are accumulating huge repositories of data 
from which little meaning can be extracted. One of our goals is to distil human comprehension from our 
observations and identify the important workspace activities that will inform our support efforts. For example, if 
two people are both talking and pointing in an activity, we will have stories which suggest who has control of 
the floor and where we should direct support. 
There are several problems that need to be surmounted before we can consider using the stories in a productive 
and supportive role. One of these issues is the inherent problems or contradictions within theories. To use 
Rienks et al and their simple dominance theory as an example, let us consider an alternative group of people to 
Betty and Tom. Let’s refer to Table 1 and examine how Rufus, Bert, Lex and Maya are developing their 
dominant behaviours in a hypothetical meeting. 
Table 1: A simple set of counts for dominance features 
 Rufus Bert Lex Maya 
Word count 3300 5500 1200 3500 
Speaking turns 18 8 35 16 
Floor grabs 13 6 30 19 
Less times interrupted 5 2 12 5 
Results ??? ??? ??? ??? 
How do we extract meaning from the numbers in Table 1? How do we attribute relative total values to each of 
the dominance characteristics? Rienks et al. used a set of eight meetings to generate their dominance features 
and they also tried to optimise their approach by minimising the number of features without losing their 
descriptive ability. Their most informative three features were: number of speaking turns, number of floor grabs 
and the number of successful interruptions. However, meetings have many different styles and they may range 
from very formal to very informal. In Table 1, Bert spoke a lot but only had eight speaking turns. Was Bert the 
secretary reading minutes from the previous meeting? Lex had the most floor grabs and speaking turns but 
didn’t say much. Was Lex a heckler and was he really the most dominant person? At best, the theories are a 
guide to understanding human behaviour but they are the only guide that we have. 
Conclusions and Future Work 
The main contribution of this paper is a framework that enables researchers to identify, understand and articulate 
in a fine grained manner the actions that people perform in small group meetings. This framework is modelled 
on known theories of human behaviour and is constructed from cognitive dust, which is the observable evidence 
of human communication within work tasks. These tasks are usually carried out in a different manner each time 
they are executed and the framework allows a computer infrastructure to remain synchronised with the processes 
as they emerge from the task. In this manner, and this is one of the ultimate goals of this research, useful support 
or tools may be deployed when they are required and in the manner that people want to use them. 
The scope of this particular work extends to the activities of the reporters, which match concepts emerging from 
within the workspace activities with existing theories from the theory bank although some commentary has also 
been made on the function of the interpreter, which draws conclusions about the workspace activities and 
decides whether or not to provide support. Future work will explore inferencing approaches within the 
interpretation mechanism as well as rule mining (Park & Lee 2007) within the theory bank. 
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